

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT****ROUTING SLIP**

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		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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2	DDCI		X		
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15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	D/NE/DO		X		
18	D/NESA/DI		X		
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SUSPENSE 19 Feb 86  
Date

Remarks

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Executive Secretary

19 Feb 86

Date

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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February 18, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President for  
National Security Affairs  
Office of the Vice President

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

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CAPTAIN JOHN BITOFF  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RICHARD MEYER  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International Development

MR. RONALD POST  
Acting Chief of the Executive Secretariat  
U. S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Senior Interagency Group No. 50  
Meeting on Afghanistan

For discussion at the 19 February SIG meeting, attached is an NSC paper on guidelines for efforts by USG agencies to strengthen the resistance alliance.

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
NSC Paper

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506SECRET

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SIG ON AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: US Policy toward Afghan Resistance Alliance

Formation of a political alliance by resistance organizations is an important development in the Afghan war. As the first effective, unified representative of the resistance, the alliance can increase the political costs of Soviet occupation. It can frustrate Soviet efforts to win credit for a "broadened" PDPA regime, and with sufficient changes in Soviet policy it could in time also become a credible interlocutor able to negotiate an end to the conflict. US policy therefore strongly supports the alliance. Reflecting this support, agencies should develop policy approaches in accordance with the following guidelines.

1. Contacts. Official USG contacts with representatives of the alliance (and also with representatives of its member groupings) should take place more frequently and at a higher level. These contacts should provide regular exchanges of information and discussions of strategy; these can be useful both to the USG and to the alliance, and can become a channel of communication in which both sides have confidence. Senior officers of Embassy Islamabad will have principal responsibility for establishing, conducting and enlarging this relationship.

2. Humanitarian assistance. US policy seeks to strengthen the alliance by enhancing its role in providing for the medical, educational, agricultural and food needs of the Afghan people and of the mujahideen. Agencies should give maximum attention to ensuring that the resistance alliance plays a steadily growing role in the receipt and disbursement of humanitarian assistance from both private and official sources.

3. International status -- bilateral. The US will provide all appropriate help to the alliance in gaining increased official access to and recognition from other governments, especially the Government of Pakistan. The example of regular American contact is just one part of this effort; it will be supplemented by strong parallel initiatives in diplomatic and other channels. The principal near-term objective of this effort will be the establishment of alliance liaison offices in third countries.

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4. International status -- multilateral. The alliance seeks increased recognition of its claim to represent the Afghan people. Even short of this goal, increased alliance participation in international organizations can dramatize the Afghan struggle. The US will assist its efforts at the United Nations and, where this is likely to be effective, with friendly governments that can promote the efforts of the alliance to gain greater recognition within the Islamic Conference.

5. Role in negotiations. All USG public statements on Afghanistan will emphasize that a settlement of the war must, to endure, be supported by the mujahideen, and that acceptance inside Afghanistan will be the ultimate practical test of any arrangements developed in the UN-sponsored indirect talks. This message should be reinforced by urging close and regular consultations with the alliance on the participants (both direct and indirect) in these talks, including on UN representatives.

Agencies should within 10 days present plans to implement these guidelines and, periodically thereafter, their record in doing so.

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